Pakistan’s Army: Unprepared to tackle terrorism?

Posted on October 22, 2007


By Mark Sappenfield | Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor



Before returning to Pakistan Oct. 18, Benazir Bhutto boldly claimed that she would take the fight to militants in Pakistan’s lawless border regions. Hours after she arrived, her motorcade was bombed, killing about 136 people.

The attack has only emboldened Ms. Bhutto, saying that it is evidence of the forces she must defeat if she is elected prime minister in January parliamentary elections. But among experts, there is doubt about what any Pakistani leader can do in the short term.

Bowing to international pressure, President Pervez Musharraf has restarted an offensive in the remote tribal areas that are rapidly becoming a hub of global terrorism. Yet early indications are that, no matter who is in charge, the Pakistani Army is ill-suited – and perhaps incapable – of doing the job.


Significant casualties and scant public support for the operation, “will become a problem in the future,” says Moeed Yusuf, director of strategic studies at Strategic and Economic Policy Research, a think tank in Islamabad. “If this continues, the Army will tone it down because there will be too many losses.” It suggests that America must temper its expectations of what Pakistan can do militarily in the war on terror or risk inflaming the situation further, through increased anti-American attitudes or even possible defections from the Army, experts say. In late August, for instance, some 250 Pakistani soldiers, including officers, surrendered to a smaller group of militants without firing a shot. Since then only 30 have been released. Meanwhile, conservative estimates suggest that 1,000 of the 90,000 soldiers deployed in the three-month operation have been killed.


For a military revered as Pakistan’s proudest institution, such a disgrace at the hands of ragtag rebels is symptomatic of a broader malaise. The offensive is almost universally perceived to be an American war contracted out to its Pakistani ally. In the past, perhaps, the Army was willing to play this role – most notably when it bred and supported resistance to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the late 1980s. But now, an Army built to counter the massive threat of the Indian military is being asked to fight its own citizens in an unpopular counterinsurgency campaign that it has neither the will nor the skill-set to fight.


“The Army officers have started realizing that this battle is not worth the cost,” says Hassan Abbas, a Pakistan expert at Harvard University. “It has had a huge impact on the psychology of the Army.” [more]